On Derrida’s Iterability : The Sameness between the Sensible and the Ideal by オガワ, アユト & Ogawa, Ayuto
Osaka University
Title On Derrida’s Iterability : The Sameness between the Sensibleand the Ideal
Author(s)Ogawa, Ayuto
CitationLaboratory of thinking. 2015
Issue Date2015
Text Versionpublisher
URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/54536
DOI
Rights
 1 
On Derrida’s Iterability 
−−The Sameness between the Sensible and the Ideal— 
                                    Osaka University  
                                                                     Ayuto Ogawa 
 
0. Introduction 
    Jacques Derrida（1930-2004）, who is a French philosopher, wrote about numerous topics in his 
books; for example, he has discussed politics, biology, mathematics, sexuality, linguistics, 
psychoanalysis, education, ethics, and so on. However some authors argue that, in short, Derrida’s 
discussion is about language1 even though Derrida wrote about a lot of themes. In fact, the three 
main books that Derrida wrote in the late 1960’s -- Of Grammatology, Writing and Difference, 
Speech and Phenomena -- might give the impression that Derrida is a philosopher, so to speak, of 
writing and language. Moreover it is true that Derrida was strongly influenced by Ferdinand de 
Saussure who is a structural linguist. But, from only such a point of view, we would not be able to 
follow Derrida’s variety of topics. However it is also true that, because of Derrida’s fetish about 
language, we are confused when we read his books.  
    The purpose of this presentation is to, by analysing Derrida’s notion of iterability, examine the 
sameness between the sensible and the ideal in order to reinterpret Derrida’s text in a broad sense 
and to understand his project of deconstruction from his first book2. First, we will clarify the reason 
why the notion of iterability is important in Derrida’s discussion. Second, we will see the relation 
between the iterability and the ideality through Derrida’s reading of Husserl. Finally we will focus 
on Derrida’s analysis of Husserl’s sensible idealization.  
 
1. The Role of Iterability in Derrida’s Discourse 
    What is iterability? In Signature Event Context, Derrida wrote that iteration is not the repeating 
of identity, but the repetition to alter3. Hence, for Derrida, iteration is the strategy to reveal 
differences dismissed by a closed theoretical identity. However Derrida did not follow the distinction 
strictly. Therefore in this presentation, I use the word ‘iteration’ as the repetition to alter.  
    Derrida criticized the metaphysics of the presence like Husserl’s phenomenology that regards 
the presence of the sense in the fulfilled original intuition as the principle of all principles. Derrida 
                                                        
1 Kaganoi（2005）said that Derrida’s discussion is just in the problem of the language throughout and 
his interpretation of Husserl is mainly concerned with the transcendental or the ideal. Jean-Michael 
Salanskis（2008）also interpreted Derrida’s thought in relation to the linguistic turn.  
2 Vicky Kirby（2011）, in her work, expressed her feeling when she was asked the reason why she 
uses the notion of the textuality while discussing the body. 
3 ‘Signature Event Context’ in Marges de la philosohie p.7 
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used iterability as a strategy against the metaphysics of the presence because iterability makes 
theoretical sense, which, based on intuitional evidence, deviates from Now-and-Here and functions 
in spite of the absence of the evidence of the original intuition. In Speech and Phenomena, published 
in 1967, Derrida criticized Living Present, the source of the evidence in the system of Husserl’s 
phenomenology, for having always already been contaminated by ‘the possibility of the repetition of 
the writing’ and ‘the possibility of death’4. 
   This summary is not wrong but we have to pay attention to the fact that Derrida did not only 
criticize Husserl but exploitted Husserl’s argument about ideality as his own notion of iterability. 
‘Absolute ideality is the correlate of a possibility of indefinite repetition.’（SP p.52）Then we have to 
investigate the relation between iterability and ideality. 
   However, before investigating it I would like to propose some points to be discussed. First, 
from our point of view, this interpretation based on Speech and Phenomena or Signature Event 
Context is problematic because the description may lead us to a Derrida that is too idealistic and 
linguistic. On the one hand, Derrida seems to propose iterability as the minimal determination of 
language; on the other hand he wrote on the relation between ideality and infinite iterability. 
Second, in Speech and Phenomena, it seems that Derrida did not clearly show the reason why the 
repetition is possible. It is sure that he wrote that the ideal form of presence itself makes repetition 
possible5. But because at the same time Derrida also criticized the presence, we have to be careful to 
decide that Derrida’s iterability is the ideal form of presence6. Besides, the explanation that language 
has iterability as the minimal determination is insufficient because I want to question the reason why 
iterability is possible.  
   In Of grammatology, Derrida wrote that the trace is the origin of all repetition and ideality7. 
In addition, the（pure）trace is the differance8. But what are the trace and the differance? The trace 
rooted in Levinas’ works has a very important role in Derrida’s work.  
   But in this presentation, I will not investigate the complicated system of the trace or the 
problem of the differance. Instead of investigating them, I will try to explain iterability with the clues 
of the character of the trace, the ambiguity between the sensible and the ideal.  
   Firstly, in the next chapter, we have to examine the relation between ideality and iterability in 
Derrida’s reading of Husserl. 
 
2. Iterability and Ideality 
                                                        
4 For example, in Speech and Phenomena chapter 7. 
5 La voix et Le phénoméne p.111 
6 Derrida did not refuse the value of presence completely. However it seems to be related to the 
problem of the singularity of the unrepeatable, the instant rather than iterability. Cf. Kei Kiritani
（2014） 
7 De la grammatologie, p.95 
8 ibid,. p.92 
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    In this section, we have to examine Husserl’s discussion of the ideality on which Derrida’s 
iterability seems to be based.  
    First, for Husserl, mathematical identities are privileged models as ideal identities through all of 
his works9. It is because geometrical objects are always the same for everyone. For example, the 
assertion ‘the fastest artificial transportation is the train’ is wrong in 2015. On the contrary 1+1 is 
always ２. The supratemporality of geometrical objects is the character of the objective ideality that 
Husserl aims to construct: 
 
What my assertion asserts, the content that the three perpendiculars of a triangle intersect in a 
point, neither arises nor passes away.’ ‘Each time I （or whoever else it may be）pronounce with 
the same sense this same sense in this same assertion, there is a new judgment. （…）But what 
they judge, what the assertion says, is all the same thing.’ ‘It is an identity in the strict sense, 
one and the same geometrical truth.’（LI, I,pp.285-286） 
 
    Second, for Husserl, ‘every ideal objectivity is produced by the act of a concrete consciousness.’ 
We can compare Husserl’s production with the Kantian revelation of mathematical objects. On the 
contrary, for Kant, ‘the first geometer merely becomes conscious that it suffices for his mathematical 
activity to remain within a concept that it already possesses.’ For Husserl, mathematical objects 
must be produced with intentional fulfillment by geometers. 
    This attitude of Husserl is related to the third point. Husserl wanted to think about the absolute 
identity of objective ideality, but the identity must not be a transcendental object in another world 
like a Platonist Idea because of his principle of principles. For Husserl, it is sure that ideal objects 
have supratemporality or timelessness distinguished from merely sensible objects. However the 
supratemporality is the omnitemporality: 
 
 [I]deality, which is but another name for the permanence of the same the possibility of its 
repetition,（…） it does not come from another world; it depends entirely on the possibility of 
acts of its repetition. （…） absolute ideality is the correlate of a possibility of indefinite 
repetition.（Speech and Phenomena p.52） 
 
    Then we have to focus on how Derrida used the word ‘ideality’ and ‘ideal’. First, Derrida seems 
to criticize the pure ideality that means both the fulfilled identity and repeatability. But because 
Derrida clearly criticizes the metaphysics of presence, then ideality must be able to mean merely 
repeatability. Therefore we try to seek the iterability as ideality without identity.  
                                                        
9 In spite of changes in Husserl’s theory, Derrida interprets the privilege as Husserl’s consistency. 
Edmund Husserl's "Origin of Geometry": An Introduction p. 27  
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    Second, although Derrida exploits the Husserlian ideality as repeatability, at the same time, 
Derrida’s repeatability has to be the alteration. It must cover ‘other in the same’. Hence Derrida’s 
ideality is not based on the mathematical one. 
    In the next chapter, I would like to focus on sensible ideality as the model of ideality without 
identity, or so to speak, the proto-type of iterability. This is because Derrida developed the analysis 
of sensible idealization in the Introduction to the Origin of the Geometry; nevertheless, Husserl did 
not write about it clearly.  
 
3. Sensible Idealization 
    For ideal identities of geometrical objects, Husserl thought they have to be transmittable in 
inter-subjective communities because, without the possibility of transmission, the geometrical 
objects that are produced in the subjective evidence of a geometer are just for him or her, that is to 
say, they are personal, not universal, and they cannot obtain their omnitemporality. It is here that 
Husserl needs the possibility of writing. Writing enables us to transmit the contents of geometrical 
truth not only in synchronic communities, but also in diachronic communities. Hence writing makes 
ideal identities perfect. 
    However when Husserl needs writing, at the same time, it means he introduces the sensible 
factual thing into the process of the constitution of ideality. In this process, writing is ‘not merely a 
constituted sensible body（Körper）, but was also a properly constituting body（Leib）.’ Husserl would 
reduce the factual danger of writing（Körper）and believe he could save ‘the intentional primordiality 
of a Here-and-Now of truth’（Leib）de jure. However Derrida opposed his attitude because, in a word, 
Körper and Leib are in fact numerically one and the same existent10. Derrida point out the limit 
where fact and right are contaminated in Husserl’s theory. 
    But it is strange that Derrida seems to treat the problem of writing in relation to the possibility 
of being destroyed rather than iteration. Introducing writing is necessary to constitute the 
omnitemporality of the ideal objectivity of mathematical objects. On the one hand, writing has the 
role of transmitting the memory of the original production of geometry but, on the other, it holds the 
possibility of being damaged and endangers the original evidence of geometrical idealities. This is 
the case that Derrida analyses in chapter 7. However, iterability is not focused on in spite of this 
argument of writing. It is because, in Introduction to the Origin of Geometry, Derrida treats writing 
by putting emphasis on its factual side.   
    Therefore, in Introduction to the Origin of Geometry, we must focus on the sensible ideality 
that is the product of imagination in the discussion about idealization. The sensible ideality is neither 
ideal objectivity like mathematics nor merely a sensible given. This instance, that is to say, the 
ideality without the identity and the resemblance which includes differences, supports Derrida’s 
                                                        
10 ibid,. pp.97-98 
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strategy of deconstruction. 
    In chapter 5, Derrida mentioned the distinction of three types of idealities: idealities of the word, 
bound idealities and free idealities based on Husserl’s explanation in Experience and Decision. 
Derrida proposed the distinction among Husserl’s idealities as below.  
 
⑴ the ideality of the sensible form of the signifier, the word 
⑵ the ideality of the signified or intended sense, 
⑶ the ideality of the object itself11  
  
    ⑴ and ⑵ are called the bound ideality because they are bound in real contingency to some 
extent. For example, the word ‘lion’ can be said many times and remain the same. But the word ‘lion’ 
is limited in factual subjectivity in a certain community in which people speak English. ‘Lion’ as the 
unity of intended sense has the higher ideality and is freer than the word ‘lion’. Various languages 
can think the same content of the sense ‘lion’. This ideality is free from all factual linguistic 
subjectivity. However the object itself is neither the expression of the sense nor the content of the 
sense. The object ‘lion’ is a natural, contingent reality. Therefore this level is also at the level of 
bound idealities.  
   On the contrary, geometrical idealities have absolute free ideality. This is the ideality of the 
highest level “the ideality of the object itself.” 
   This distinction is, however, insufficient; nevertheless, it contains the possibility of sensible 
ideality, because it does not explain why ideality is possible. 
    However in Introduction of Origin of Geometry, Derrida proposes more detailed distinctions 
because, mainly in chapters 7 and 10, he treats the analysis of the sensible embodiment of the 
ideality in contrast to the analysis of the writing I mentioned above12.  
    In chapter 7, Derrida proposes two cases concerned with sensible embodiment. First, the 
embodiment is the inscription of an absolutely ‘free’ and objective ideality within the ‘bound’ 
ideality; in other words, the embodiment is the inscription of a freer ideality within a less free 
ideality, for example, the incarnation of the geometrical truth within the word.13 Second, ’the 
embodiment is inscription of a necessarily bound ideality within a real-sensible event.14 It is the 
latter case that Derrida problematized. In the latter case, the inscription of a bound ideality within a 
real-sensible event, he proposes ‘another step of mediate ideality which Husserl does not directly 
                                                        
11 We can also see this distinction in Speech and Phenomena. In chapter 4 of Speech and 
Phenomena, SP p.52 
12 Edmund Husserl's "Origin of Geometry": An Introduction p.89. Leonard Lawler proposed to 
divide Derrida‘s discussion into four parts. But this division is not sufficient.（p.106）  
13 ibid. p.89 
14 ibid,. 
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describe, but which we think can be located on the basis of strictly Husserlian concepts.15’  
    Mediate ideality refers to ideal vague morphological types that are proper to the corporeality 
of graphic and vocal signs. This type of ideality does not have the ideal identity like mathematical 
objects but ‘a certain identity’ which is imposed and recognized each time in the empirical fact of 
language. 
    Next, in chapter 10, Derrida analyzes Husserl’s ideation. In Origin of Geometry, Husserl wrote 
that before exactitude emerges, proceeding from the factual, an essential form becomes recognizable 
through a method of variation16. Derrida interprets this sentence through the explanation in Ideen 1 
and Crisis. By imaginary variation, we can get ‘inexact but pure morphological types: “roundness” 
under which is constructed the geometrical ideality of the “circle”.17’  
    This roundness is sensible in that it has to be distinguished from pure geometrical ideality, 
which is released from all sensible or imaginative intuitiveness18. However at the same time this 
roundness is called pure sensible ideality19. Besides, Derrida distinguished a pure sensible ideality 
from a pure sensible reality20. Then, from the description I presented above, we can get the relation 
between ideality and sensibility as below. 
   
⑴ an objective ideality 
⑵ a bound ideality 
⑶ a pure sensible ideality 
⑷ a pure sensible reality 
 
    In a sensible ideation, starting from ⑷ a pure sensible reality, at the level ⑶, we can get the 
minimal ideality which is repeatable. Besides, because a pure sensible ideality and a bound ideality 
are different from an objective ideality, both of them are related to iteration. Then what makes a pure 
sensible reality a pure sensible ideality makes iterability possible. Derrida surely wrote about it. It is 
imagination21: 
 
    Only an imaginative intending can attain that ideality in its pregeometrical purity. But 
this pure ideality is of a sensible order and must be distinguished carefully from pure 
                                                        
15 ibid,. 
16 ibid,. p.123 
17 ibid,. pp.123-124. 
18 Ibid,. 
19 ibid,. 
20 ibid,. p.125 
21 It is related with the imaginative variation used for getting the ideality. But for Husserl in Origin 
of Geometry, the role of the imagination seems to be a little bit changed because of the problem of 
the omnitemporality and the Idea in the Kantian sense.     
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geometrical ideality, which in itself is released from all sensible or imaginative intuitiveness. 
The imagination is what gives me the pure morphological type（…）.（ibid,. p.124） 
      
    After this analysis, following Husserl’s discussion in Origin of Geometry, Derrida moved to the 
problem of the unity of the Idea in the Kantian sense.（‘Starting from an anticipatory structure of 
intentionality, we go beyond morphological ideality toward the ideal and invariant pole of an infinite 
approximation.’（IOG p.134））As I wrote above, the supratemporality of the ideal identity means 
omnitemporality. Because of this character, the ideal identity must be supported ‘infinitely’ by 
repetition in fact. This ‘infinity’ must regulate the factual repetition toward the ideal identity 
although we cannot obtain this ‘infinity’ in fact. This ‘regulative pole for every infinite task’ is the 
Idea in the Kantian sense22. Although Husserl tries to regulate the factual contingency by the Idea in 
the Kantian sense, this Idea in the Kantian sense itself is out of the evidence of the presence because 
it remains the infinite telos for our finite existence in fact. The leap from the sensible to the ideal 
would be postponed infinitely in fact.     
 
Telos =the Idea in Kantian sense 
⑴ an objective ideality 
------------------------------------Infinite Delay 
⑵ a bound ideality 
⑶ a pure sensible ideality 
------------------------------------ Imagination 
⑷ a pure sensible reality 
 
    Then, an objective ideality repeats the wholly identity but only in the infinite telos. A pure 
sensible reality cannot be repeated. A bound ideality and a pure sensible ideality produced by the 
imagination can repeat themselves, including in gaps. The iteration produced by the imagination 
produces the differences in the delay between the fact and the telos, although Husserl hoped for the 
unity of the ideal identities.  
    Here it is important that Derrida mentions ‘an unforeseeable and inorganic proliferation of 
morphological types’.（IOG p.126) ’Unforeseeable’23 is the character of an ‘event’ that is beyond 
Husserlian teleology in Derrida’s later works. Even though Derrida wrote that the geometrical unity 
would not be influenced by the proliferation of forms24, it was only as an explanation of Husserl’s 
                                                        
22 Ibid,. p.137 
23 Read Matsuda（2014）on ‘foreseeable’.  
24 ‘[H]owever generous the proliferation of its forms and metamorphoses may be, they do not call 
again into question the unified sense of what, in this development, is to be thought of as the 
geometrical science’ Edmund Husserl's "Origin of Geometry": An Introduction p.52 
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logic.  
 
4. Conclusion  
    Iterability is often interpreted as a characteristic of language. It is reasonable in some sense 
because language is an exemplary in Derrida’s discussion. However, as we confirmed, the 
imagination enables iteration as the repetition of minimal identity, the same under identity (for 
instance, phoneme, grapheme, roundness), rather than language (for example, the structure of 
signifier and signified used by structural linguistics). This shows that the problem of the iterability 
can be interpreted as a problem between the sensible and the ideal. This perspective can immediately 
be connected to Derrida’s theory of the imagination, mimesis, fiction, specters, and so on. By 
regarding Derrida’s theory as the something between the sensible and the ideal, we can understand 
more easily the reason why Derrida treated not only writing, language, literature but also, at the 
same time, virtual reality, technology, prostheses, and body. Body is not language. Derrida, however, 
had to think about body because it has ambiguity between binary logics.  
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